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‘What an awful body the UN have become!!’† Anglo-American–UN
relations during the Congo crisis, February–December 1961
Alanna O’Malley*
Institute for History, University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands
When Lord Salisbury passed the above remark in November 1961 it was at a
moment of intense frustration for the British Foreign Office during the Congo
crisis as the UN accelerated their efforts to restore territorial integrity to the
Central African state by ending the secession of Katanga. The British viewed
UN actions as a threat to their political and economic interests in the Congo
and in Central Africa but crucially, also found that they were at loggerheads
with the United States. This article examines Anglo-American relations at two
key junctures in March and December 1961 when Britain successfully appealed
to the United States to intervene in order to stall UN actions in the Congo. The
cooperation between President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan to constrain UN Congo policy reflects the centrality of the
organisation in Anglo-American relations at the time and also highlights an
understudied aspect of the relationship between the London and Washington. It
will be shown that the crisis put a strain on the Anglo-American relations,
leading to efforts by the British to play on the Cold War fears of the Americans
by urging them to limit the actions of the UN. It is argued that the changing
nature of the organisation helped to foster tensions in the Anglo-American
relationship, exposing inherent differences of opinion about how American Cold
War objectives should be balanced against the British agenda for decolonisation.
The two incidents highlighted here reflect how the crisis became a challenge for
Anglo-American relations and ultimately reveal the waning influence of the
United States and the UKwithin the UN at the time.
Keywords: Anglo-American relations; United Nations; Congo crisis; Cold War;
decolonisation
When the crisis erupted in the Congo immediately following independence on 30 June
1960, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was initially insouciant. Despite
his prophetic ‘Winds of Change’ speech delivered in Cape Town earlier that year, he
did not immediately perceive the Congo crisis as a challenge to Anglo-American
relations, nor a threat to his own government. He declared bombastically that ‘MP’s
might froth over their club claret but they were not going to risk their seats and
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†Letter from Chairman of the Monday Club Robert ‘Bobbety’ Salisbury, to British foreign Sec-
retary Lord Home, 26 November 1961. FO 371/155107, National Archives London. Emphasis
in the original. The Monday club was a pressure group within the Conservative party created in
January 1961 in order to protect British interests and white minority regimes during the process
of decolonisation. For further see Simon Ball,The Guardsmen, HaroldMacmillan, Three Friends
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their emoluments over a very large country a long way away of which they knew very
little.’1 However, the Congo crisis was to prove more than just another colonial war of
independence. By February 1961, Britain increasingly clashed with the United States
during Congo negotiations at the UN and by December, the Macmillan Government
faced a vote of confidence over the issue of whether or not to supply British bombs for
the UN military campaign against the secessionist province Katanga. Moreover, real
divisions began to emerge in Anglo-American relations as London and Washington
D.C increasingly found themselves at odds as the Congo question exposed their fun-
damentally different approaches to decolonisation in Africa.
The conflict that erupted between the allies over how the Operations des Nations
Unies au Congo (ONUC)2 should proceed during the Congo crisis has been tradition-
ally underplayed in the literature on Anglo-American relations.3 Not only did the
crisis threaten to divide two of the five Major Powers at the UN over how the organ-
isation should proceed, it also proved to be a serious challenge to the Anglo-American
relationship. With the combined contexts of the Cold War and decolonisation, the
Congo crisis was a moment that revealed how American Cold War aims came into
conflict with the British agenda for decolonisation. Despite Macmillan’s nonchalance,
the crisis posed a challenge to British economic and political interests in Africa. It par-
ticularly struck a chord among the Salisbury Tories given their support for Roy
Welensky the white Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
He was firmly of the belief that the secession of the south-eastern province of
Katanga from the rest of the Congo on 7 July 1960 was advantageous to British inter-
ests in the region. Much of the British Government’s Congo policies were influenced
by this conviction and the hesitancy to come to blows over the issue with Welensky,
who carried some weight with the British Conservative Party, and the white-led
Central African Federation.4 Britain also had several significant investments in the
firm Tanganyika Concessions that had a 14.5% shareholding in the Belgian Union
Minière du Haut Katanga Company, which controlled most of the resources of the
Congo. Alongside the business interests of companies like Shell and Unilever, these
economic considerations were further complicated by the fact that Katanga was criti-
cally important to the copper-belt in Central Africa which straddled the Northern
Rhodesian border and affected British authorities in nearby states of Tanganyika
and Uganda.5
For the United States, the Congo was of particular interest not least due to mount-
ing hostilities with the USSR, but also because Katangawas a source of uranium used
in the American atomic energy programme. In addition, as awhole in 1959 the Congo
produced 69% of the world’s industrial diamonds, 49% of its cobalt, and 9% of its
copper. The United States, Britain and Belgium had been the forerunners in develop-
ing and processing these resources and minerals with trilateral trade agreements exist-
ing between them since 1944. By 1960, although the American dependence on
Congolese uranium ores had decreased, there was still a cooperative economic frame-
work between the three nations that developed the ores as a source of commercial
energy power.6 In addition, the United States Inter-departmental Stockpile Commit-
tee (SSACB) viewed the Congo as of primary importance in the sourcing of borty and
diamonds.7 Given this broad range of intertwined economic and political interests for
both countries in the Congo, it did not initially appear that Congolese independence
would threaten this Anglo-American nexus of power in Central Africa. It was the role
Journal of Transatlantic Studies 27
the UNwas to play in the Congo which would exacerbate the tensions between Britain
and the United States, and threaten to expose the disparity in their positions.
The UN proved to be a dynamic forum that in two separate incidents in February
and December 1961 threatened to expose the conflict between Britain and the United
States over the Congo question. The changing composition and structure of the delib-
erative forums of the Security Council and the General Assembly had severely eroded
the power base of both Britain and the United States within the organisation. The
debate that raged over the actions of ONUC had the effect of revealing their dimin-
ished capacity to control the evolution of events. As a former colonial power in the
tense atmosphere of the General Assembly where emotions surrounding issues of
decolonisation were running high, British prestige was damaged by allegations of col-
lusion with subversive forces in Katanga. From Washington’s point of view, far from
being a dependable ally, the difference of opinion with Britain was revealing of the fra-
gility of Western unity,8 the problems of being tarred by association with European
colonial powers and the limits of Anglo-American influence within the UN.
This article will focus on two episodes, which reveal both the tensions in Anglo-
American relations during the Congo crisis, and their failed efforts to contain UN
action. Recently declassified documents from February 1961 reveal that following
the adoption of the February Resolution that authorised UN peacekeepers for the
first time to use force in self-defence, Britain appealed to the United States for a mor-
atorium on further discussion of the Congo issue. In seeking to keep the Congo off the
UN agenda, Britain wanted to avoid public discussion of the topic which might reveal
the divergence in views with the United States over the question of how the resolution
would be implemented. Although London succeeded in securing American support
for the initiative, the Congo remained firmly on the UN agenda throughout
the summer of 1961. Anglo-American efforts to temper further UN action and set
the agenda for UN Congo policy failed as the Afro-Asian bloc, in cooperation
with the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld called for the immediate
implementation of the resolution. This resulted in military action in September
1961 as UN forces attempted to end the secession of the province of Katanga with
military force. Far from avoiding further discussion of the Congo question, efforts
to enforce a moratorium at the UN failed as the debate intensified over how the
UN should proceed.
Anglo-American attempts to stall further UN military action in December 1961
were more successful. Facing a House of Commons vote of confidence in his govern-
ment over the issue of supplying bombs to ONUC to use to end the secession of
Katanga, Macmillan, having exhausted all his options at the UN, appealed to
Kennedy for help. Following an intense discussion with the British Ambassador to
the United States, David Ormsby-Gore, the President agreed to instruct his Chief
UN Representative Adlai Stevenson to put pressure on the UN Secretary-General
to arrange a ceasefire between UN troops and the Katangan Gendarmerie. The fol-
lowing day, UN Secretary-General U Thant announced a ceasefire in Katanga and
Macmillan secured a majority vote in the House of Commons debate. As events tran-
spired, the ceasefire was only temporary and the resulting armistice was flaunted less
than two weeks later.
What is important about these two instances is that they highlight how Anglo-
American cooperation attempted to shape the UN agenda in the Congo. In the first
case, despite close Anglo-American negotiation, efforts to stall debate on the Congo
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in New York failed. While this emphasises the importance of the UN dimension for
Anglo-American relations, it is also revealing of the lack of influence the alliance
had within that context. Although the December 1961 effort to halt further UN mili-
tary action succeeded temporarily, the UN proceeded to end the secession definitively
with a final military effort in December 1962. Both attempts to temper UN action and
control the Congo agenda display not only the gravity of the Congo crisis for Anglo-
American relations but also show howmuch importance Britain and the United States
attached the maintenance of a united front on the question. While both British and
American economic and strategic political interests were also in play, the intense nego-
tiations that took place between London and Washington over the Congo question
illustrate their differing motivations to control the UN agenda and ultimately
served to shed light on how the crisis, through the UN, rendered the two countries
in a deadlock.
The Congo crisis erupts
When the situation in the Congo exploded into a civil war that gained international
dimensions with the intervention of the UN in July 1960, it was a period during
which the Macmillan government in Britain were enjoying the fruits of friendly
relations with the United States. The alliance between Macmillan and President
Dwight D. Eisenhower had been revived as the Cold War struggle against inter-
national communism accelerated. Under the surface of Anglo-American unity
however, disagreements surrounding British plans for decolonisation and policy on
colonial questions at the UN simmered. The Congo crisis brought these disagreements
to the surface in a way that caused Britain and the United States to recalibrate their
UN policy, roughly agreeing to disagree on their failure to formulate a joint approach
to the issue.
The British position on the Congo crisis was one of awkwardness from the begin-
ning. As Lise Namikas describes, ‘Britain… cringed at any precedent–setting inter-
national intervention in what they deemed a private matter of decolonization.’9
When Hammarskjöld first brought the issue of intervention before the Security
Council on 13 July 1960, both Britain and France abstained from voting for the res-
olution mandating intervention. Both Madeline Kalb and Namikas interpret their
abstention as a way of papering over the cracks in the international consensus on
the question by acceding to, if not voting for, the creation of ONUC. However in
adopting this position, the British also began to define the character of their UN rep-
resentation on the Congo question that would increasingly prove to be a position of
avoidance and dissonance. Crucially, this proclivity towards avoiding any overt state-
ments on the issue of UN intervention gradually portrayed Britain as resisting the
efforts of the organisation in the Congo. This was in stark contrast to the clear
support the United States granted ONUC from its inception and significantly, it high-
lights the opposing positions of Britain and the United States on the Congo question
from the outset.
This apparent distance between the allies on the Congo, although reflective of
wider challenges that would rise to the surface as the crisis progressed, stands out as
a moment of intense disagreement during a longer period of good Anglo-American
relations. The relationship between London and Washington flourished during the
administration of President Eisenhower as old wartime camaraderie was revived to
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help overcome the rift created by the Suez debacle in 1956. Eisenhower (who was the
highest serving American general during the SecondWorldWar) andMacmillan (who
had been an envoy in North Africa) had worked together in North Africa.10 Of all the
possible choices, Macmillan has been referred to as ‘the best suited to heal the trans-
atlantic breach’ following the Suez debacle.11 An Anglo-American himself, his per-
sonal relationship with Eisenhower was an important avenue towards improving
relations between London and Washington. Confirming this sense of growing inti-
macy towards the end of Eisenhower’s presidency John Baylis points out that
Britain provided a strong and stable ally for the United States throughout the
darkest days of the Cold War and in return, the British were to establish a very fruitful
deal in nuclear defence cooperation, signing in 1958 the Agreement for Cooperation on
Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, which was later referred to as
‘without a doubt one of the most important peacetime agreements ever arrived at
between the two countries’.12
Efforts to strengthen the Anglo-American relationship were not without chal-
lenges, especially in the areas of nuclear and defence cooperation. The Skybolt-
Holy Loch arrangement between Eisenhower and Macmillan in 1960 although
referred to as reflective of a nuclear relationship ‘enjoyed by no other ally of the
United States’,13 would draw Britain into controversy in 1962. When the adminis-
tration changed in the United States with the advent of President John F. Kennedy,
the ‘Europeanist’ camp in the State Department began to push American relations
more towards Europe and less towards London. While the fabled ‘Mac and Jack’
relationship thrived rather unexpectedly, the Anglo-American dynamic subtly began
to change. It quickly became apparent that despite Macmillan’s determination to
use the Anglo-American relationship as the bedrock of Britain’s international prestige,
his failed efforts at summitry in May 1960 signalled that Britain’s role as a mediator
between the superpowers was quite limited. The succeeding crises in Anglo-American
relations over the Skybolt missiles issue in 1962 and the French veto of British entry to
the EEC in 1963, tend to be interpreted as part of awider pattern of British decline as a
world power, or, in the view of Nigel J. Ashton, as representative of the irony of inter-
dependence.14 In contrast, the Congo crisis offers an insight into the evolving dynamic
of Anglo-American relations as being more than an inevitable tale of decline. In effect,
Britain resistance towards American pressure to acquiesce and allow the UN to use
force against Katanga exposed the inherent division between the allies over how
American Cold War aims contrasted with British decolonisation and revealed the
limits of Anglo-American influence in an organisation increasingly concerned with
moderating these processes.
The Congo crisis has largely been absent from, or underplayed in, the existing lit-
erature on Anglo-American relations during this period. Only John Kent’s recent work
has sought to examine the character of the relationship during the crisis, which he
assesses as being rather ‘unspecial’. He argues that British refusal to consider using
force to end the secession of Katanga was merely a cover for the protection of
British economic interests in the province. Such was the extent of influence the Tanga-
nyika Concessions company had with the Conservative party that, ‘the short-term
requirement to mitigate European companies’ economic losses…was important
enough politically to supersede the primacy of standing alongside the Americans’.
Kent provides substantial evidence for this claim, illustrating the close links
between the Foreign Secretary Lord Home and the Chairman of Tanganyika
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Concessions and the extensive network of the Conservative Party’s benefactors who
were also closely associatedwith the company.15 The substantial influence of these net-
works manifested itself directly in British Congo policy, according to Kent, most
clearly in British intransigence over the use of force by the UN to end the Katanga
secession.
The secession of the south-eastern province of Katanga in July 1960 greatly exacer-
bated the crisis as a whole. The leader of the breakaway province Moise Tshombe was
largely held to be a Belgian stooge and Katangawas considered a ‘white man’s enclave’
mainly controlled by the Belgian mining company Union Minière du Haut-Katanga
and Tanganyika Concessions.16 During the first six months of the crisis, while the
British held to their position that force could not be used by the UN to end the seces-
sion, the United States failed to coordinate a clear Congo policy. Eisenhower’s speech
to the UN General Assembly in 1960 reflected the rather lacklustre approach of the
United States to the Congo question, echoing the American shock at developments
through that summer. From the outbreak of the crisis, the United States had sought
to limit Soviet expansion into Africa by positioning the UN between Congolese
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.17 In this
way it was hoped that the irascible Lumumba would be deterred from turning to
Moscow for help. What was unforeseen in Washington was Lumumba’s unpredictable
nature, to the extent that he would draw the ire of the Secretary-General within a
month of the arrival of UN forces in Katanga.
Hammarskjöld visited the provincial capital Elisabethville in August 1960, partly
to oversee the peaceful introduction of UN troops to Katanga, but also to assess the
situation personally and try to negotiate with Tshombe. He had deliberately avoided
consulting with Lumumba on his way through Leopoldville for fear that the Congo-
lese Premier would disrupt the plans he had carefully negotiated in Brussels for the
replacement of the Belgian troops in Katanga with the UN force. However, the intro-
duction of ONUC troops and the opening of a dialogue with Tshombe had the effect
of enraging Lumumba who accused the Secretary-General of ignoring his govern-
ment, declaring, ‘The government and people of the Congo have lost their confidence
in the Secretary-General.’18 Hammarskjöld was infuriated with Lumumba’s response,
and the latter’s refusal to meet with him during his return journey through Leopold-
ville. The Secretary-General even declined to delay his return to New York by one day
so that the Congolese delegation could travel with him.19 At the heart of the dispute
between Hammarskjöld and Lumumbawas not just the failure of political ethics but a
real disagreement over what the ONUC force was to be used for. Hammarskjöld was
adamant that the force was there to prevent civil war in the Congo by hastening the
removal of Belgian troops. However, Lumumba viewed the UN force as a means by
which he could militarily end the secession. Hammarskjöld’s failure to consult with
the Congolese government before his public meeting with Tshombe combined with
his refusal to help Lumumba end the Katangan secession had the effect of radicalising
Lumumba’s views. Now, he turned to Moscow for help.
On 15 August, Lumumba issued telegrams to the People’s Republic of China and
the Soviet Union requesting military aid and personnel.20 In order to demonstrate his
commitment to sacking the UN, he included copies of his correspondence with Ham-
marskjöld. While Khrushchev’s response was decidedly muted, the Soviet leader
agreed to send, in addition to the food and medical aid the USSR had already sup-
plied, 15 Ilyushin-18 planes for troop transportation, and weapons and ammunition
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for Lumumba’s military campaign to end the secession of Katanga.21 While this
appeal for Soviet aid would not have a decisive effect on Lumumba’s campaign
against Katanga, it did have major significance for US policy.
The apparent swing towards Russia was met with shock and disbelief in the State
Department. Kalb argues that Lumumba’s repudiation of Hammarskjöld threatened
to unhinge American policy in the Congo as a whole by creating space for the Soviets
to destabilise the Congolese government.22 The prevention of the extension of Soviet
influence into Africa through the Congo was at the very core of American policy.
Lumumba’s flirtation with Khrushchev had the effect of making him a persona non
grata in the United States but crucially, it also reignited the idea of removing the
African leader from power in order to regain control of the situation. Ousting
Lumumba took place in two stages. The first was an American sponsored coup in Leo-
poldville, whereby the American embassy supported President Joseph Kasavubu’s dis-
missal of Lumumba as Congolese PrimeMinister on 5 September. Larry Devlin, Chief
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in the Congolese capital, details how
his agents helped to organise anti-Lumumba protests in the capital in order to sup-
plant his image as a popular, legitimate leader.23
Lumumba responded to his dismissal by announcing that he was the only elected
leader in the Congo and in turn, he fired President Kasavubu, essentially creating a
vacuum of power and making the complex political situation in Leopoldville, even
more precarious. The CIA followed up on their initial attempts to get rid of
Lumumba by sponsoring another coup, this time led by General Mobutu, the Chief of
the Congolese army. Devlin recounts assuring Mobutu that the US government would
recognise a new government under Kasavubu and even pledged financial support for
the operation.24 Mobutu effectively dismissed the Congolese government and installed
his ‘College of Commissioners’ by the end of September. As the CIA set about the
second leg of their plan to get rid of Lumumba permanently, the United States shifted
their focus to the General Assembly where a campaign to generate support for the
recognition of Kasavubu’s UN delegation, rather than Lumumba’s, as the official repre-
sentatives of the Congo was launched.25 Lumumba had marked his cards by swinging
towards Moscow and openly breaking relations with Hammarskjöld. However, his elim-
ination did nothing to clarify US policy, nor build a consensus on the Congo with
London. Rather, his assassination had the effect of inflaming tensions on all sides in 1961.
Fanning the flames of discord – the February resolution
While Lumumba’s fate had effectively been sealed by his swing towards Moscow, it
was only in February 1961 that the news of his assassination became public. The
announcement had the effect of radicalising more neutral members of the Afro-
Asian bloc, who immediately denounced the role of the Britain, the United States
and the UN in the crisis. This came on the back of mounting pressure on the
United States to take some form of affirmative action over Congo. In particular this
pressure came from the Belgians who were extremely concerned with developments
in the country. In a telegram from the American Ambassador in Brussels, William
Burden outlined the gravity of devising a coherent stance on the issue, urging:
I am fully aware that unilateral measures outside the framework of general Western policy
can serve only to destroy the position of Belgium and the West in the UN and in Africa
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without any countervailing advantage, but the situation is in part a result of the vacuum
created by failure to formulate clear and effective US policy. If we are not able to formu-
late clear US policy on Congo… to deal with the rapidly detonating situation and sell it to
our allies rather soon, different elements in Belgium will… continue to supply their own
paramilitary ad hoc solutions.26
The potential implications of such actions were not lost to the new administration
under President Kennedy. Secretary of State Dean Rusk remarked to his staff even
before Lumumba’s assassination was revealed that: ‘the stakes are so large that we
need to take the ceiling off our thinking as to solutions’.27
On 1 February, Kennedy approved the revised US–Congo policy, the three principle
elements of which were; a newmandate for ONUCwhich would increase their authority
to control all military elements in the Congo, the reestablishment of a functioning gov-
ernment in Leopoldville and increased efforts to block outside assistance.28 While the
plan granted precedence to action through the UN, sources reveal that behind the
scenes the United States was not ruling out the possibility of unilateral action if the situ-
ation required it. Ruskmaintained that if this proved to be the case, ‘it would be essential
to show that we had exerted ourselves to work effectively through the UN’.29 Whatever
efforts the United States may have been making to hedge their bets, the situation began
to spin out of control when the Afro-Asian bloc introduced a draft resolution that called
for the UN troops to be given the right to use force in self-defence as a last resort to
prevent full blown civil war.30 Although the State Department was divided as to
whether or not to support this resolution, the United States eventually voted for a
version on 21 February that included some elements of their original plan.
The issue of the use of force, which the British were so opposed to, was now set
front and centre in the UN debates on the Congo. During deliberations, the British
remained strongly opposed to the use of force against Katanga which for Macmillan
in particular would be a two-fold blow; threatening British economic interests in the
region and politically difficult because of Tory support for the Central African Federa-
tion and Roy Welensky’s relentless defence of Tshombe.31 Considering these serious
political implications, the British viewpoint on the amended US–Congo policy was
less than enthusiastic. As Alan James describes: ‘an orderly, ideologically quiescent,
and weakened country such as Britain was not inclined to wax enthusiastic over
what could be interpreted as UN adventurism’.32 This attitude was reflected by the
Chief British Representative at the UN Sir Patrick Dean, who ‘was convinced that
the UN had done all it could in the Congo’. In the same vein, the head of the
Foreign office African Department believed that ‘the UN effort should end’.33
The British were however wary of isolating themselves within the UN, noting
ahead of the Security Council meeting that,
in order to avoid a deadlock in which we might alienate the sympathies of the moderate
Africans and make them withdraw their support from the UN effort, we could, in the last
resort, accept the amendments the Americans proposed as a minimum.34
Although James argues that Britain equivocated in this instance in order maintain
influence with the Afro-Asians, and prevent a break with the Americans, the
African Department reported to the Cabinet following the passing of the resolution
that the British had succeeded in entering a clarification that the resolution could
not be used to empower the UN to use force to impose a political settlement.35 In
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this way, the British sought as a minimum to influence how the resolution would be
implemented. Further, the following month policy planners in Whitehall drafted a
position paper for British initiatives at the UN, and formed a set of proposals for
the direction of Western policy towards the Congo issue. Though officials understood
the importance of outwardly maintaining support for the resolution as they recognised
that it would hold the African states in some form of agreement over what was to
happen in the Congo, they were not prepared to stand idly by and let the UN take
full control of the situation.36 The agreement for a moratorium on the issue was
part of the British effort to stall the UN efforts in this vein.
While the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office were busy strategising
about how to limit the effect of the resolution, concerns were also being raised in
the State Department over the direction of British colonial policy. During the week
following the passing of the resolution, Kennedy dispatched Undersecretary of State
for Political Affairs, Averell Harriman on a visit to London, Bonn and Rome in
order to drum up support among the relevant heads of state.37 Over dinner in Admir-
alty House, Macmillan emphasised the great work that Britain was doing in unwind-
ing the empire and decried the activities of Undersecretary of State for African Affairs
George Mennen (‘Soapy’) Williams in Africa:38 ‘It was deeply wounding to Britain
when the United States Government or Americans individually accused the UK of
being an evil reactionary influence and pilloried her in the United Nations.’ He
implored Harriman to communicate to the President that all Britain wanted to do
was to be left alone for a few years in order to finish the job of dismantling the
empire. ‘If American sniping at British policy went on,’ he said, ‘bitter feelings
would be aroused in the UK which would do real damage to Anglo-American
relations.’39 Harriman expressed surprise at the level of British resistance to the resol-
ution stating that the American position was that the United Nations effort could
work, provided that the propaganda efforts of the Russians could be halted.
These simmering differences between London and Washington soon threatened to
come to the surface over the issue of how the resolution would be implemented.
Although, British UN officials had initially consoled themselves with the notion
that the resolution would have no immediate effect in the Congo, it was clear that
the question was beginning to raise tensions. Whitehall officials were under the
impression that the United States were ‘overly sensitive to Afro-Asian opinion’,
which had the effect of granting too much legitimacy to ONUC.40 A senior British
Foreign Office official reported in April 1961 that
the use of force by the United Nations not going to produce an answer in the Congo. The
Congolese are learning to be quite skilful at non-violent non-cooperation which is liable
to develop (as in India in the old days) into occasional violence.41
In an attempt to limit the possibility to use the resolution to end the secession, and
crucially, in order to prevent the possibility of a public schism with the Americans,
Britain secured guarantee from the United States for a moratorium on the Congo
at the UN. Conceding that the crisis was proving detrimental to Western unity, the
State Department recommended President Kennedy to agree to a limiting of the
debate on the Congo.42 In avoiding the public debates, the United States agreed to
‘work in the United Nations corridors in order to head off or defeat radical resolutions
which may be presented and to encourage a moderate outcome’.43
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This decision to introduce a moratorium on the Congo issue was a direct response
to the, by now, obviously different Anglo-American positions on the question, and the
general feeling of ‘advancing steadily into a bog with no way out’.44 As Dean surmised
it, ‘we keep on saying that we are there to give the United Nations full support… at the
same time we are not ready in fact to back the Secretary-General up to the extent
which he thinks necessary to accomplish his purpose’. He continued,
we are drifting into an increasingly difficult position… although we avowedly support the
UN effort we really do not want it to succeed too well…The time really has come when
we ought to think out carefully what our objective is and if possible reach agreement
about it with the Americans.
British reports from the UN indicated that the debate on the Congo in the current
atmosphere was damaging to their interests, to their relationship with other countries
and to the UN as a whole.45 The moratorium for a debate on the Congo did little
to effect any change in the atmosphere at the UN or solve the crisis in the Congo;
by May 1961 the organisation still faced the same questions over the reintegration
of Katanga and the United States continued to urge Britain to pressure Tshombe
into negotiations.46
The agreement in April 1961 to introduce a moratorium on the Congo debate was
as much to disguise the widening gulf between the British and the Americans, as it was
an effort to regain some control over the UN and avoid a damaging disagreement in
the atmosphere of hostility that pervaded in New York. The decision on the part of
Kennedy’s administration in 1961 to shift the American stance on the Congo was
directly related to ensuring that the Soviets did not expand their influence in
Central Africa but crucial was also the maintenance of favourable relations with the
increasingly powerful Afro-Asian bloc. The American consent to a ‘moratorium’47
on the Congo issue at the prompting of the British should not be read solely as the
influence of the British government on American Congo policy. What it does
display, is that considerations of Anglo-American relations played a role in policy-
making at the UN in particular where the Western dominance was under threat. In
this instance, the public nature of debate at the UN threatened to undermine
Anglo-American efforts to coordinate Congo policy. It also set the tone for the
Anglo-American dynamic on the issue; the struggle to limit the actions of the organ-
isation in the Congo and the increasing difference of opinion over how the organis-
ation should proceed. The Congo again brought the two countries into conflict in
December 1961 when they sought once more to limit the actions of the UN. While
the April moratorium proved to be a small concession, the United States intervened
for a second time at the UN in response to anther British request in December. Simi-
larly, the intervention did little to contain the organisation, nor moderate its actions in
the Congo but it did reflect London’s ability to play on the Cold War fears of the
Americans in order to protect British interests during the crisis.
Using force again – December 1961
On 28 August 1961, the UN launched a surprise military campaign codenamed Oper-
ation Rumpunch in Katanga. ONUC troops began disarming Katangan troops, and
seized the major buildings around Elisabethville in an effort to force Tshombe and his
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Belgian political advisors to withdraw from the province. The surprise nature of the
move caught Tshombe off-guard and he agreed to comply immediately if the oper-
ation was halted.48 The response to Rumpunch in Brussels and London was vigorous
opposition. British Foreign Secretary Lord Home even proposed pointing out to
Hammarskjöld that ‘stability in Katanga depended on maintaining the Tshombe
administration’.49 The United States continued to give the Secretary-General tacit
support, which soon melted away when, in order to seize the gains made in the first
round, the ONUC followed up by launching Operation Morthor on 13 September
1961.50 The result was disastrous. This time the Katangan gendarmerie were prepared,
and fierce fighting broke out in Elisabethville while air strikes halted the advancement
of ONUC forces. The diplomatic fallout was equally damaging. Kennedy was said to
be ‘extremely upset’ that Hammarskjöld had authorised the operation without con-
sulting with Washington.51 Britain was equally incensed and Macmillan publicly
threatened to withdraw British support for the operation. The Americans attempted
to press Hammarskjöld into negotiating a cease-fire with Tshombe. On 17 September
the Secretary-General’s plane crashed on the way to the negotiating table in Ndola,
killing all onboard.
The devastating impact of the suspicious death of Hammarskjöld,52 combined
with the political damage of the operation against Katanga, raised the issue of use
of force again between Britain and the United States. On 1 November, Permanent
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar telegraphed the
State Department with the reflections of the British Government on the development
of policy in the Congo. The memo included a long discussion of the mandate granted
to the UN and how it was to be weighed against the circumstances of potential civil
war. Crucially however, it concluded that
The Resolution does not authorise the use of force against Tshombe to subdue Katanga as
a political measure. It does justify the use of force against him if that is necessary to
prevent a civil war. Exactly at what point the use of force would be justified is a matter
for appreciation.53
Significantly the memo also pressed the urgent need for further consultation with the
United States on this matter revealing Britain recognition that the United States policy
in the Congo was still on a divergent course to that of Whitehall. The effort to conceal
these Anglo-American differences was to prove imperative the following month when
Britain faced a serious crisis over the question of bombs for the UN.
A crucial factor in the failure of Operation Morthor had been the fact that the
United Nations were severely materially disadvantaged due to a lack of aircraft
with which to respond to the air attacks from Katanga. It was agreed in Washington
that the supply of aircraft to the UN would be a central part of the implementation of
the Security Council Resolution 24 November 1961.54 The most significant number of
aircraft at the disposal of the UN for this operation was six Canberra jets, in the pos-
session of India, but British-made. Therefore, Britain was requested to supply the
bombs. This was highly controversial for Macmillan however, it was widely felt that
such a gesture would have a very negative impact on Tshombe and on the powerful
Katanga lobby within the Conservative Party. At a Cabinet meeting on 14 November,
it was noted that the supply of such bombs would cause serious domestic political dif-
ficulties and there was ‘bound to be keen criticism’.55 The extent of British opposition
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to the use of force in Katangawas simultaneously highlighted when it was noted by the
Cabinet that ‘It would not be in our interests nor would it help our multi-racial policies
in Africa if Mr Tshombe were overthrown.’56
Indeed as his biographer Alistair Horne aptly describes it, ‘although in spirit Mac-
millan was with Katanga, he continued to pay lip-service to the United Nations’.57 In
such a position, the PrimeMinister took the decision on 7 December to supply twenty-
four 1000-pound bombs for use against Tshombe’s mercenary flyers. This was in
accordance with an agreement that Home would increase the pressure on the
United States to urge the new Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula to the nego-
tiation table with Tshombe, thereby hopefully avoiding the situation in which the
bombs would ever be required for use.58 In an exchange of letters between Acting
UN Secretary-General U Thant and Dean, the UK specified the terms and conditions
under which these bombs were donated, outlining that they were only to be used in
self-defence and against the airstrips from where the opposite fleet departed.59
However, the damage was effectively done; the request for bombs had been granted
and now, as Macmillan put it: ‘we were in for a row’.60
The agitation of the British Cabinet was fuelled by the contradicting statements
coming from the UN on what precisely the aims of the organisation in Katanga
were, and how exactly the bombs would be used. Contrary to assurances given
to Dean by Thant on 8 December, Sture Linner, Officer-in-Charge in the Congo,
gave a controversial interview to a Swedish newspaper the following day in
which he stated that the long-terms aim of the United Nations was to force a pol-
itical solution on Katanga by smashing the present political leadership and their
military strength. ‘He also maintained that United Nations officials in the Congo
had carte blanche for the conduct of military operations there.’61 To the horror
of the Foreign Office, it appeared that Britain was playing a part in what they
had consistently railed against from the beginning; the quashing of the Katangan
secession by force.
Things really began to fall apart when Ethiopian soldiers in the service of the UN
killed three Red Cross workers.62 These inconsistencies between statements from UN
in New York, and the actual events in Katanga created chaos around the issue of the
supply of bombs in the Westminster Cabinet room where the Lord Privy-Seal noted
that this was ‘not entirely satisfactory to us for it still left it open to United Nations
forces to secure military control over the whole of Katanga on the grounds that
they were securing their lines of communication’.63 Effectively the British were now
caught in a no-win position. The decision to supply the bombs, with or without attach-
ing conditions for their use, opened the government up to attack from the Katanga
lobbyists within the Conservative Party. However, to withdraw the statement which
promised the bombs would make it appear that the government had changed its
mind, and likely stir up allegations of succumbing to pressure from such supporters
of Katangan independence. In addition Dean cabled the Foreign Secretary from the
UN that ‘our reputation here will suffer severely’ if Britain revoked the promise to
supply the bombs.64 Caught between the UN and the Conservatives, the decision of
the Cabinet was, predictably, to take the middle ground. Britain agreed to supply
the bombs if Thant guaranteed that they would be used only in self-defence and
additionally, the British representatives in Katanga would use all their influence to
urge Tshombe to negotiate an agreement with the Central Government for the end
of the secession.65
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Relations with the United States were also effected by the British stance over the
bombs for the UN affair as it confirmed the fears of the State Department about
London’s hostile attitude to the ONUC in Katanga.66 The President himself was
coming under intense pressure from the outcry over atrocities committed in the
region, both from the British and the Belgians but also from the Afro-Asians at the
UN who increasingly urged the Secretary-General to quash the secession.67 The
tense atmosphere in the White House was recorded in a conversation on the Congo
between Under-Secretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland in October when the latter
noted that ‘what is bothering the President is that people have been getting to
him’.68 The position of the United States was at this stage edging closer to the UN
and the Afro-Asian states, who, armed with their resolution of 24 November, advo-
cated for further use of force to definitively end the secession. The United States
was well aware of the growing rift with the British and while Kennedy was adamant
about the importance of maintaining Western unity, at the same time he was insistent
that there could be no ceasefire until Tshombe agreed to negotiate.69 Domestically, the
conflict was also squeezing Kennedy as the well-financed Katanga lobby in Washing-
ton, led by Senator Thomas J. Dodd and the Senate Minority leader Everett
M. Dirksen announced on 13 December the formation of the Committee for Aid to
Katanga Freedom fighters.70 It has also been argued that Kennedy did not want a
major fall-out with Macmillan over the Congo just weeks before the two were to
meet in Bermuda to discuss the resumption of atmospheric nuclear tests.71 One
point was clear; the United States would not support British efforts to arrange a cease-
fire through the UN, unless Tshombe could be forced to negotiate.
In addition to the realisation the London and Washington were growing apart on
the Katanga question, Macmillan’s government was still facing a significant threat
from within the ranks of the backbenches. The Conservative Party was split
between those who believed that this gesture was not enough to bring about a
whole solution to the crisis and the Katangan lobbyists, urged on by the cries of indig-
nation from Welensky. Peter Clarke argues that Macmillan’s ambiguity was one of his
finest political assets, helping him ‘quell the Conservative right wing, which was rarely
confronted with the fact that the Prime Minister’s policies were out of kilter with his
rhetoric’.72 However, in this instance the discrepancy between Macmillan’s rhetoric
and his policies was widely exposed and given Tory sympathies for significant business
interests in Katanga, and their allegiance with Welensky, Macmillan potentially faced
a vote of no confidence in his government over the issue when it was announced that
the bombs would be used to smash Tshombe’s forces. As Macmillan noted his is diary,
‘the trouble in the Party is that in addition to the small group of people who really hate
me… the anxiety about [the] United Nations performance in the Congo had spread to
the whole centre of the Party’.73
The challenge toMacmillan’s leadership came in the form of a House of Commons
debate on foreign affairs, on the 14 December, which included a motion that approved
of the Government’s actions over the whole affair. The level of personal anxiety Mac-
millan was feeling about this waswell expressed in his 15 December letter to the Queen
in which he observed, ‘The 1000 lb bomb however became the detonator of a kiloton
row, which threatened yesterday to become almost a megaton row in the House of
Commons.’74 The playing field for the debate was such; the Labour Party, the Liberals
and broadly speaking the ‘left wing’ of the Conservative party supported the UN
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action in opposition to the right-wing and centre Tories, who believed the Government
had reneged on their promise not to let Katanga be crushed by the UN.75 Facing the
Commons debate on 14 December, there is general agreement that Macmillan went
into ‘something approaching a flap, or even a panic’.76 To all concerned it appeared
that his government may well fall over the Congo issue.
If the source of Macmillan’s problems lay at the UN, it was also there he could
potentially find the solution. If the question of further use of force by ONUC
against Katanga could be avoided by arranging a ceasefire, the UN action could be
contained and the diplomatic impasse in which Macmillan found himself both with
the United States and his own party could be resolved. However, the efforts of the
British UN delegation and the Foreign Office to rein back UN action at this point
were revealing of their lack of influence within the organisation. Cabling the
Foreign Office on 11 December, Dean warned that it would be impossible to
summon a Security Council meeting unless an agreement could be reached with the
Americans who ‘take a different view about the present situation in the Congo and
are clearly prepared to go further in support of the United Nations and the use of
force in Katanga than we would deem desirable’.77 Furthermore, he warned that
even if an agreement was reached with the United States, securing seven votes on
the Security Council would be virtually impossible while in the process, Britain
would be heavily attacked by the Afro-Asians who would try ‘to make us the scapegoat
for the United Nations lack of success’.78
With no possible avenue for restraining the UN available through the organisation,
Macmillan, desperate to garner votes for the Commons debate, telephoned Kennedy
on the 13 December in order to enlist his support in halting the UN action in the
Congo. He pressed that Britain believed the UN were exceeding their mandate and
making it look like they would quash the breakaway province by force.79 It fell to
British Ambassador to the United States, David Ormsby Gore, to germinate these
seeds of concession. Over dinner that night, Ormsby Gore, who was a close personal
friend of the President, came up trumps. In the presence of the Ambassador, Kennedy
telephoned Ball and instructed him accordingly: ‘I have got David Gore sitting beside
me here, and he will explain what it is the British Government wants done, and I want
it done.’80 It is important to note that there were simultaneous negotiations on-going
between Ball and Rusk, who telephoned from a NATO Foreign Minister’s meeting in
Paris that the Congo question was the most important issue on the table. Home had
warned Rusk that if the fighting spread, the British government would have to comple-
tely withdraw support.81 The combination of pressures was enough to urge Kennedy
into action and the result was a diplomatic success. The following day, U. Thant
announced a ceasefire in Katanga and Macmillan emerged with a majority of 94
votes in the Commons, leading the President to remark: ‘Well, that was a pretty
good majority; I wonder whether we needed to have gone to all that trouble the
other night in order to get it?’82
This victory for Macmillan and Anglo-American relations was short-lived.
Although it temporarily produced a ceasefire and the Kitona Agreement in which
Tshombe acceded to the re-integration of Katanga, he rolled back on his consent
almost immediately as soon as he arrived back in Elisabethville, by insisting that he
had been forced to sign it under duress.83 Similarly, despite the effort to paper over
the cracks, this was the last time the British were able to play on the Cold War para-
noia of the Americans to try to limit UN action against Katanga. While they
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continued to cling to their position against the use of force, they were increasingly mar-
ginalised within the organisation from this point forwards on the issue of the Congo,
especially as the United States henceforth formulated its Congo policy without taking
note of British concerns. This was most obvious in December 1962 when, despite
another personal appeal from Macmillan to Kennedy at the Nassau conference to
hold back the UN from military action against Katanga, the President turned a
deaf ear to British pleas.
From 28 December 1962 to the 3 January 1963, UN military forces moved into
Katanga and quashed Tshombe’s regime. The question remains why, only 12
months later, the United States refused to listen to British requests for the United
States to try to moderate UN action. Ashton has argued that American unwillingness
to use their influence again with the Secretary-General was made clear through their
support, politically and militarily of Operation Grandslam. ‘In the last resort,
Kennedy had decided that it was more important to bring an end to the Katangan
secession, and forestall any possibility of Soviet intervention, than heed to British
special pleading.’84 It was also true that the rigidity of the American objection to
the use of force against Katanga had exhausted the patience of the State Department
who in November, 1962, described British leadership at the UN as ‘desultory’, point-
ing out that this had further damaged the Western position on various issues.85 This
aimless British attitude had also exposed the government to allegations of collusion
with Tshombe and his Belgian advisors, particularly when Britain refused to
support economic sanctions against the leader of the breakaway province. After the
Cuban missiles incident, and with increasing sporadic violence across the Congo,
the United States moved decisively away from the British position, in the process,
further attempting to reassert their authority over the UN in an effort to pursue
their Cold War agenda.
Conclusion
Despite successive efforts to conceal Anglo-American differences over the Congo
question, the gulf between London and Washington was unbridgeable. As Dean
himself noted ruefully, ‘It is not for lack of consultation, whether in Washington or
in New York, that this differing attitude has persisted.’86 As the crisis developed,
the British feeling that the UN was a ‘damned nuisance’87 led them to maintain a pos-
ition of intransigence on the Congo which brought them no closer to resolving the
issue with the United States. After 1961, Britain sought to spin out the crisis with as
little involvement as possible whereas the United States attempted to reassert their
influence over the direction of UN Congo policy. At the centre of these differences
were opposing positions on the question of the use of force by the UN in Katanga,
and the overall thrust of UN Congo policy combined with the problems by the
ways in which the Cold War interacted with decolonisation in the Congo. The Amer-
ican efforts to prevent the infiltration of Soviet influence into the country, led the State
Department to grant increasing political and financial support to the UN operation
against Katanga. American officials viewed the secession as destabilising for Congo-
lese independence and formulated their policy around the strengthening of the Central
Government in Leopoldville and the eventual reuniting of the country. This was in
direct contrast to the British who developed Congo policy around the issue of protect-
ing their economic interests and networks in Katanga, which were an important part
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of the wider programme of British decolonisation in Africa. The acceleration of Cold
War hostilities directly conflicted with British efforts to prevent the loss of their net-
works by the quashing of the secession by force. The question of the use of force by
the UN was in many ways used as a foil by both sides to skirt around their opposing
strategic considerations.
Crucially, it was the UN in three distinct dimensions that brought these problems
to the surface during 1961. In March, the damaging nature of the public debate at the
UN led the British to seek an agreement for a moratorium from the United States. The
UN climate, at that time reeling from the news of the assassination of Lumumba, was
particularly hostile towards the Western powers. The increasingly influential Afro-
Asian bloc, whose cause was championed by Hammarskjöld, dominated the
debates in the General Assembly, to the extent that Britain and the United States
sought, unsuccessfully, to keep the Congo question off the agenda. Their efforts and
failure to do so point to the impact of UN debates on Anglo-American relations
and the limits of their influence what the General Assembly chose to discuss.
The request for a ceasefire in December highlights another dimension of the UN,
which at this time came to bear on Anglo-American relations: that of the UN as an
actor, through ONUC in the Congo. The inconsistencies that have been described
between instructions issued from New York and their interpretation and implemen-
tation on the ground served to render the active capacity of the UN as a rather
unwieldy and difficult instrument. Anglo-American efforts to stall further military
action received only limited success and the UNwent on to end the secession militarily
just a year later. Moreover, the military actions of the UN troops raised the question of
how and when the UN could use force, which was the central disagreement between
the United States and the UK. Quite apart from the potential damage of public
debates, the actions of ONUC represented another way in which the UN challenged
the Congo polices of both countries.
The third dimension of the UN is evident in both instances, and that is the impor-
tance of maintaining Western unity in a multi-lateral forum where the Afro-Asians
increasingly controlled the UN Congo agenda. For the United States, keeping a
united Western position at the UN during the crisis was essential to sustain their
power bloc. The position of the West was increasingly marginalised due to the
advent of the Afro-Asians but also due to the rhetorical attacks from the USSR.
Although alignment with NATO allies, and crucially the former colonial powers of
Britain and France, threatened to tar the Americans by association and open them
up to accusations of neo-colonialism, the ‘Europeanists’ at the State Department
and Kennedy himself consistently tried to paper over the cracks in the consensus.
For the British, this aspect of UN relations was also important as the Foreign
Office was eager to maintain favourable relations with remaining colonies and
newly decolonised African states. The powerful vitriol of the Afro-Asian bloc did
little to advance this cause and threatened to destabilise British relations with the
Central African Federation. In these three capacities the UN brought the Congo
crisis to bear on Anglo-American relations in a way that changed British conceptions
of the organisation as becoming an ‘awful body’.
The two moments of Anglo-American efforts to reassert their authority at the UN
that are highlighted here serve to characterise their relationship over the Congo. For
the most part it was a struggle to cooperate and formulate a joint approach and
most often the United States and the UK failed to limit the actions of the UN.
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Their efforts can be viewed not just as an attempt to influence UN policy and maintain
Western unity but also to mask internal differences in opinion over core issues. What is
evident is that both the UN and the broader international environment with its under-
current of the struggle between nationalism and imperialism are features of the Congo
crisis which directly affected British and American interests in Africa in a similar way
to events that had occurred during the Suez conflict. What was different about the
Congo was that the nature of the UN had changed entirely and the joint Anglo-Amer-
ican action did little to neither advance their interests nor maintain their influence. The
tendency towards inclusive internationalism in order to safeguard both American and
British positions at the UN but also Anglo-American relations as a whole, was ren-
dered fruitless as the UN ultimately brought an end to the Congo crisis on their
own terms. Instead, Britain and the United States had found that they had fundamen-
tally different visions of how to order the decolonised world.
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